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Abstract
This paper concentrates on a possible application for spider diagrams; using them to simplify the
task of identifying the eﬀect of individual component failures, leading to system failures in safety
critical software or hardware designs. http://www.energytechnologycontrol.com/
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1 Introduction
This paper identiﬁes a possible application for spider diagrams, and in partic-
ular that :
• Spider Diagrams can be used to model component operational and failure
modes
• A diagram can be derived from a spider diagram, where each spider is
represented by a set in the new diagram.
• These derived spider diagrams can be combined with other derived dia-
grams, thus nesting spider diagrams.
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• This process should dramatically reduce the number of checks to perform
in safety critical analysis.
• Spider diagrams can include a default spider, being that which is is not
specifed explicitly (a kind of catch all undeﬁned cases spider).
Note this paper does not concern itself with the reliability of the system
(i.e. mean time between failure etc) but with possible resultant states of
the system due to component failures. The safety of potentially dangerous
or explosive industrial plant is far more important than its reliability. The
overriding philosophy here is that a system should be able to detect that it
has become faulty, and revert to a safe operational mode. Human intervention
can then assess and repair faults.
It has been long known that components of systems and operational modes
can be modelled with Z [1] : thus Spider diagrams can be used to model
components and their operational and/or failure modes.
2 Background - Safety Critical Modelling
2.1 Components
Currently safety critical control systems are built from components with known
failure modes. For instance, resistors can be purchased that only fail by going
open circuit.
Electrolytic Capacitors, however, can fail by both shorting and going open
circuit.
2.2 A Typical Safety Measure
To give an idea of measures already in place in safety critical systems such as
industrial gas burner controllers, consider the independent watchdog function,
implemented in hardware.
If a burner controller’s micro processor (or the software running on it
were to fail) the system could obviously become unsafe. So in the event of
microprocessor failure, a watchdog system will (with a tight time window) wait
for a pulse to indicate all is well every say, 50 ms. The watchdog is normally
a second microprocessor. Should no pulse arrive, or a pulse arrive outside the
time window, the watchdog processor will shutdown the system using relays
to main power independent to relays controlled by the main processor.
Note that the watchdog processor must also have its own clock. This
is because if they both ran from the same clock signal, a single failure, the
clock/oscillator, could stop the system from shutting down. The main proces-
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sor must periodically check the watchdog by providing a false late signal and
then cancelling it on seeing that the safety relay has been ordered open.
Note the implied philosophy here. Should one of the two microprocessors
fail, the system will revert to a safe state.
2.3 Safety Standards
A feature of safety critical systems speciﬁcations is to demand, at the very least
that single failures of hardware or software cannot create an unsafe condition
in operational plant. Further to this a second fault introduced, must not cause
an unsafe state, due to the combation of both faults.
This sounds like an entirely reasonable requirement.
However, to ensure complete coverage, each of the eﬀects of the failure
modes must be applied to all the other components. Thus each component
must be checked against the failure modes of all other components in the
system. Mathematically with components as ’c’ and failure modes as ’Fm’.
checks = { (Fm, c) |
∧
c = c}(1)
Where demands are made for resilience against two simultaneous failures
this eﬀectively squares the number of checks to make.
doublechecks = { (Fm1, Fm2, c) | c1 = c2 ∧ Fm1 = Fm2 }(2)
If we consider a system which has a total of N failure modes (see equation





for individual component failures and their eﬀects on other components
when they fail. For a very small system with say 1000 failure modes this would
demand a potential of 500,000 checks for any automated checking process.
European legislation[3] directs that a system must be able to react to two
component failures and not go into a dangerous state.
This raises an interesting problem from the point of view of formal mod-
elling. Here we have a binary cross product of all components (see equation
2). This increases the number of checks greatly. Given that the binary cross
product is (N2 −N)/2 and has to be checked against the remaining (N − 2)
components.
NumberOfchecks =
(N2 −N)(N − 2)
2
(4)
Thus for a 1000 failure mode system, roughly a half billion possible checks
would be required for the double simultaneous failure scenario. This asto-
nomical number of potential combinations, has made formal analysis of this
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type of system, up until now, impractical. Fault simulators [7] are commonly
used for the gas certiﬁcation process. Clearly this massive task needs breaking
down.
Modularising the problem so that unnecessary checks can be factored out
is desirable!
3 Failure Mode Modular De-Composition
Imagine a complicated system built from components combined to form mod-
ules. The modules are combined to form sub-systems and the sub-systems
combined to form the ﬁnal system. If each module/sub-system is modelled
and has a ﬁnite number of failure modes, the massive number of checks to be
considered is reduced dramatically.
For instance the failure of a capacitor a the power supply producing a high
ripple noise level does not need to be considered for every other component.
Rather it has become another well deﬁned failure mode of the power supply,
which must be considered in relation to how that aﬀects other modules. Most
modules (say a heating element) would not consider this failure mode as a
fault.
This means that each spider diagram will derive a new spider diagram,
which contains sets for all the spiders deﬁned in the original diagram. This
derived spider diagram can then be used to interact with other modules in the
system that depend upon it.
In ﬁgure 1 three modules ψ χ and φ are developed from components.
Each of these produce a new spider diagram which simply holds the failure
modes of the modules. The modules ψ and χ are combined to produce a new
spider diagram τ . This produces a new spider diagram representing the fault
modes of τ and thus becomes a module/sub-system. The entire system is then
deﬁned by combining τ and φ and the results of that spider diagram create a
new spider diagram consisting of the failure modes of the entire system.
The use of predeﬁned euler diagrams, used as templates to produce more
complicated euler diagrams is discussed in [4]. The work described here ex-
tends this concept to add an additional stage. That of converting a spider
diagram into a new diagram where each spider is represented as a set. this
new diagram is then taken for inclusion into higher level diagrams.
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Fig. 1. Formal Modular Dependency De-Composition
4 Using Spider Diagrams to model operational modes
of components
Consider a system where basic components have given sets of failure modes.
Each component has a set of contours corresponding to operational/failure
modes. A module built from these components includes all these contours,
where necessary.
The module is then analysed looking into the eﬀect of all operational/failure
modes of components on the module. Spiders are used to describes opera-
tional/failure modes of the completed sub-system.
Consider the following theoretical components with sets of operational
modes modes thus:
• Type α having operational modes { αok, αA }
• Type β having operational modes { βok, βA, βB, βC }
• Type γ having operational modes { γok, γA, γB, }
Imagine a system ψ that is built from one of each of the above components,
that has a set of operational modes, say A, B, C and D.
ψstates = { ψok, ψA, ψB, ψC , ψD }
These failure modes are due to combinations component failure modes. If
all components are “ok” then the sub-system will have a state “ok”.
ψok = { αok, ∧ βok, ∧ γok }
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Fig. 2. Component to Module Failure Mode Diagram







= αok ∧ ( βA ∨ βB ) ∧ γB
ψC
∆
= αB ∧ ( βA ∨ βB ∨ γB )
The deﬁnition of ψD implies a default state, it could be described as being
the default not OK state.
ψD
∆
= ¬ ψok ∧ ¬ ( ψA ∨ ψB ∨ ψC)
This can be more clearly represented by a spider diagram with the addition
of a ’default spider’, ψD. See ﬁgure 2. Without the default spider all failure
modes would have to be represented on the diagram and a very large spider
drawn to represent it.
The facility of having a default spider will help in producing practical mod-
els of modules. Imagine a power supply for instance. For most combinations
of failure modes the power supply will simply not work, but for some selected
combinations of failures it will behave in incorrect but well deﬁned modes.
In tabular form, or as a Karnaugh Map [6] each of the 2N states would
have to be represented; in this case 29 entries. The spider diagram with an
added ’default spider’ is much easier to understand.






Fig. 3. Component to Module Failure Mode Diagram
Fig. 4. Simple Heater Control System
5 Hierarchical Ordering of Spider Diagrams
In the example above the spider diagram in ﬁgure 3 was derived from ﬁgure
2. This diagram could now be combined with other diagrams to form a higher
level diagram. A hierarchy of diagrams could thus be produced ending with a
representation of an entire system. .
5.1 Simpliﬁed Example of a Hierarchical Spider Diagram
In order to run through a example to show modularisation of a safety system,
consider a very simple heater controller. It has a power supply that provides
AC for the heating element and DC for a micro processor which uses an on
board ADC to measure the temperature and a relay to turn on/oﬀ current to
the heater. See ﬁgure 4.
Taking each of these modules in turn (in a simpliﬁed and incomplete way).










Fig. 5. Power Supply Components
5.1.1 The Power Supply
This simpliﬁed power supply can fail in 4 ways.
• Normal Operation
• Supply No Current (a default condition if no other is true)
• Supply AC but no DC to the microprocessor
• Supply DC but no AC
• Supply the wrong voltage (mains) to the entire circuit
These are derived from the spider diagram in ﬁgure 5. Note that “No Current”
is the default spider for this diagram.
Each of these failure modes can be used as a set to determine the behaviour
of the systems which rely on it. A conversion process could be used to create
a diagram to model other circuit elements dependent upon it. The diagram
in ﬁgure 6 shows this after ’conversion’.
The next stage is to take a system which depends upon the power supply.
The Microprocessor is the obvious choice. This will function correctly when
given DC, and will be damaged by mains voltage. It will not care if the AC
voltage (for the heater element via the relay) is present.
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Fig. 6. Power Supply Spiders Converted into Sets for Further Modelling
Fig. 7. Power Supply Failure Modes Combined with Microprocessor Operation
The Relay and Heating element depend on both the power supply and the
microprocessor, and is dealt with later.
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Fig. 8. MicroProcessor Failure Modes
5.1.2 The Micro Processor
This requires stable DC in order to operate. Also internally the ROM, RAM,
IO or ADC could fail. However, to simplify this example the internals of the
microprocessor will not be dealt with.
Combining the diagrams, gives us two microprocessor modes. OFF, and
RUNNING. These spiders (see ﬁgure 7) can now be converted into a spider
diagram where again each spider is represented as a set. This is displayed in
ﬁgure 8.
5.1.3 The Relay and Heating Element
The Relay can fail in two modes, it can weld itself ON, or it can fail to respond
to a TURN ON signal from the microprocessor IO line. The Heating element
can go open circuit and thus stop functioning. The relay depends on both
the Microprocessor and the power supply (the A.C. part anyway) to function
correctly.
A spider diagram for the relay/heating element combination with a default
spider oﬀ “OFF” or “NO HEAT” can thus be constructed. See ﬁgure 9.
Thus when the derived spider diagram for the relay and heating element
(see ﬁgure 10) is combined with the Microprocessor and the Powersupply A.C.
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Fig. 9. Spider Diagram combining Power Supply, Micro Processor and relay/heater
Part, we will have a failure modes deﬁnition for the entire system.
The fact that HeaterAlwaysOn is one of the states possible from a single
failure should be seen as quite alarming ! In Mathematics this fault could be
described as
HTR ALWAY S ON
∆
= RelayWeld
∧ ( PS AC ONLY ∨ PS NORMAL OPERATION )
The modular process has proved that this combination is possible. How
likely it is to occur is another matter and is beyond the scope of this discussion.
The methods described here are designed to tackle the requirements for single
and double failure of components leading to unsafe conditions, as described
in European Legislation for the safety of Gas burner systems. [3].
5.1.4 Combining all Diagrams - Comparing with cross product of all compo-
nents
This idea represents bottom-up modular decomposition of interacting systems
reducing the number of cross product checks required. This spider diagram
(9) shows that one single fault 1 and several obvious double faults can cause
this system to fail.
1 Relay Weld, in practice relays are connected in series and controlled by separate fail safe
systems
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Fig. 10. Derived Diagram representing possible System States
6 Extending Failure Mode Modular De-Composition to
Double Simultaneous Component Failure Scenarios
For double failure mode the same bottom up technique can be used but check-
ing for double failures within the components. This will probably normally
create some extra failure modes per module (i.e. the binary cross product of
failure modes will generally be larger than the single failure modes).
The double failure modules will still be separate modular entities, but each
module checked for combinations of two failures, and the resulting hierarchy,
using double fail scenarios to progress up to the ﬁnal system model.
These double failure modules will therefore produce derived spider dia-
grams, which when combined with other modules, will also undergo double
failure mode checking. Obviously this will involve more work and checking
than the single failure models, but will not require the astronomical number
of checks demanded by a binary cross product of all possible double instances
of all component failure modes.
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